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Algebraic aspects of solving Ring-LWE, including ring-based
improvements in the Blum-Kalai-Wasserman algorithm
KATHERINE E. STANGE
Abstract. We provide a reduction of the Ring-LWE problem to Ring-
LWE problems in subrings, in the presence of samples of a restricted
form (i.e. (a, b) such that a is restricted to a multiplicative coset of
the subring). To create and exploit such restricted samples, we propose
Ring-BKW, a version of the Blum-Kalai-Wasserman algorithm which
respects the ring structure. Off-the-shelf BKW dimension reduction
(including coded-BKW and sieving) can be used for the reduction phase.
Its primary advantage is that there is no need for back-substitution, and
the solving/hypothesis-testing phase can be parallelized. There is also
the opportunity to exploit symmetry to reduce table sizes. The results
apply to two-power cyclotomic Ring-LWE with parameters proposed for
practical use (including all splitting types).
1. Introduction
Ring Learning with Errors (Ring-LWE) [19] [20], and Learning with Er-
rors (LWE) [22] more generally, are leading candidates for post-quantum
cryptography. The cryptographic hard problem (Search Ring-LWE ) is for-
mally similar to discrete logarithm problems, so that protocols can be trans-
ferred from the latter context to the former. But it also allows for new ap-
plications, such as homomorphic encryption [6]. Ring-LWE is also fortunate
in having security reductions from other lattice problems.
Ring-LWE is distinguished from Learning with Errors (LWE) by the use
of lattices from number fields. This injection of number-theoretical struc-
ture leads to performance improvements, but may add vulnerabilities. So
far, the number-theoretical structure has been only weakly exploited for
attacks. The ring structure plays a role in security when the error distri-
bution is skewed [8] [9] [10] [13] [14], or the secret is chosen from a subring
or other ring-related non-uniform distribution [5]. However, the best known
attacks on parameters suggested for implementation are still generic attacks
for LWE, e.g. [2]. The Blum-Kalai-Wasserman (BKW) algorithm is one
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such attack, which proceeds (in the first phase) combinatorially to create
new samples in a linear subspace of the original problem, while control-
ling error expansion [3]. BKW has the drawback of requiring exponentially
many samples, so lattice algorithms are generally preferred. Nevertheless,
its performance has been of significant interest: for analysis and recent im-
provements, see [1] [12] [15] [16] [17] [18].
This paper focuses on two-power-cyclotomic unital (but equivalently, dual
[11] [21]) Search Ring-LWE, with no restriction on the splitting behaviour
of the prime q. The core of the paper is a reduction from higher-dimensional
Ring-LWE problems with samples of a restricted form, to lower-dimensional
Ring-LWE problems with the same error width, which is given in Theorem
5.2. The restricted form is as follows: samples (a, b) such that a lies in
a cyclotomic subring, or a fixed multiplicative coset of such a subring. In
the context of these theorems, it is natural to ask about creating samples
of this restricted form using a ring variant of the Blum-Kalai-Wasserman
algorithm.
One thus obtains a Ring-BKW algorithm, which uses the reduction phase
of BKW, including all known speedups, to reduce the Ring-LWE problem
to a subring. Then, the symmetry of the ring structure allows us to engi-
neer an entire suite of subring problems in polynomially more time, whose
solutions collectively solve original Ring-LWE problem, again in polynomial
time. Thus, the ‘hypothesis testing’ phase of BKW is parallelized, and the
exponential ‘back-substitution’ phase is eliminated. State-of-the-art off-the-
shelf code for the BKW reduction phase and hypothesis testing phase may
be used. In Section 8, we describe the Ring-BKW algorithm.
The paper also addresses the use of symmetry to reduce the table sizes in
BKW, here termed advanced keying in Section 9. We also discuss a square-
root speedup over exhaustive search (which may be used, for example, in
hypothesis testing); see Corollary 5.3.
The key theoretical properties which are potentially advantageous (to an
attacker) of Ring-LWE vs. plain LWE, are:
(1) Ring homomorphisms into smaller instances of the problem (the
main tool of [9] [10] [13] [14]).
(2) The ability to rotate samples, e.g. replacing (a, b) with (ζa, ζb) or
(a, ζb), which are different but related Ring-LWE samples (see no-
tation in Section 2); these represent symmetries of the lattice.
(3) The existence of subrings as linear subspaces (which is important in
[5]).
(4) More generally, the multiplicative structure of certain linear sub-
spaces.
(5) In the case of 2-power cyclotomics, the orthogonality of the lattice
of the ring of integers and the orthogonal nature of the trace.
For us, all five of these attributes play an important role. It is a secondary
purpose of this paper to lay out these advantages in a clear manner, to
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facilitate future analysis of the security of ring aspects of Ring-LWE. See
Section 4.
Finally, it is also a secondary purpose of this paper to provide a treatment
of the Ring-LWE problem which is inviting to the mathematical community.
Code demonstrating the correctness of the algorithm is available at:
https://math.katestange.net/code/ring-bkw/.
Acknowledgements. First, I would like to thank the anonymous referees
on an earlier draft of this paper, who pointed out an important simplifi-
cation. Second, I would like to thank my mother, Ursula Stange, and my
husband, Jonathan Wise, without whose childcare help in the face of snow-
storms, viruses, cancellations and fender-benders, this paper simply would
not have been completed. To mathematician moms (and dads) everywhere:
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2. Background and Setup for Ring-LWE
It is typical to set notation for Ring-LWE as in, for example, [5]; here
we briefly review this notation in our context, and define the Ring-LWE
problems.
2.1. Number field K and ring R. Let K be a number field over the
rationals, of degree n. Then K is equipped with a bilinear form given by a
modification of the trace pairing,
(1) 〈α, β〉 =
∑
σR
σ(αβ) +
1
2
∑
σC
Re(σ(α)σ(β)).
Here the sums are over real and complex embeddings, respectively (note
that including both elements of each pair of conjugate complex embeddings
necessitates the factor of 12). This gives an isomorphism of KR := R ⊗Q K
with Rn, taking the pairing above to the standard inner product. We can
also denote the norm by ||x|| = √〈x,x〉. One can also access this inner
product using the Minkowski or canonical embedding, as the standard inner
product.
The ring of integers R of K forms a lattice in KR.
2.2. Gaussian distribution. Having geometry (in particular a norm ||·||2)
on KR allows us to define Gaussian distributions. For a Gaussian parameter
r > 0, we write
ρr : KR → (0, 1], ρr(x) = exp(−pi||x||2/r2).
Normalizing this to obtain a probability distribution function r−nρr, we
obtain the continuous Gaussian probability distribution of width r on KR,
denoted Dr.
Note that, when considered with respect to an orthonormal basis, such a
distribution is the sum of independent distributions in each coordinate, each
having width r. In this paper, we are concerned exclusively with this case.
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With this normalization, the variance is r2/2pi, and one standard devia-
tion is r/
√
2pi. It is a sum of independent Gaussians in each coordinate for
which the range [−r, r] corresponds to
√
pi/2 ∼ 1.25 . . . standard deviations.
In practice, the tails of the Gaussian may be cut off, so that the number
of possible values in each coordinate is finite.
One may discretize a Gaussian distribution to obtain a distribution Dr
on a lattice L ⊂ KR. That is, one takes
ρr(L) =
∑
λ∈L
ρr(λ)
and one samples element λ ∈ L with probability
ρr(λ)
ρr(L) .
If L has an orthonormal basis, then again this distribution consists of inde-
pendent distributions on the coefficients of the basis.
2.3. Prime q and quotient ring Rq. Let qR be the extension to R of a
rational prime ideal qZ. The fundamental setting of the Ring-LWE problem
is the ring Rq := R/qR.
Letting q = qe11 · · · qegg be the unique decomposition of q into distinct prime
ideals qi in K, the Chinese remainder theorem gives
Rq ∼=
g⊕
i=1
R/qeii .
If q is unramified (which is typically the case), then ei = 1 for all i. If K is
Galois (also typically the case), then the Galois group acts transitively on
the qi and they all have the same residue degree (the residue degree is the
dimension of the quotient field R/qi as an Fq-vector space).
2.4. Ring-LWE distributions. For any s ∈ Rq (the secret), and any dis-
tribution ψ over Rq (the error distribution), we write As,ψ for the associated
Ring-LWE distribution for secret s over Rq × Rq, given by sampling a uni-
formly over Rq, sampling e from ψ, and outputting (a, b := as+ e).
Such outputs (a, b) are called samples, and in a crytographic application,
these are observed publicly, while the secret is not meant to be exposed.
For the error distribution, we wish to define a ‘small’ distribution on Rq,
i.e. concentrated near the origin (in comparison to q, which is large). It
is typical to choose for the error distribution a discretized Gaussian distri-
bution as described above (considered post factum modulo qR). This is
the context in which security reductions apply. In implementations, it is
sometimes suggested to approximate this by a uniform distribution on a
box around the origin, etc.
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2.5. Ring-LWE Problems. The two fundamental Ring-LWE problems
are (a) search: to compute the secret, upon observing sufficiently many
samples; or (b) decision: to determine if the sample are hiding a secret at
all, as opposed to being random noise. We state them more formally as
follows.
Definition 2.1. The search Ring-LWE problem, for error distribution ψ
and secret distribution ϕ, is as follows: Given an error distribution ψ over
Rq and a secret distribution ϕ over Rq, and some number of samples drawn
from the distribution As,ψ for some fixed s drawn from ϕ, compute s.
Definition 2.2. The decisional Ring-LWE problem, for error distribution
ψ and secret distribution ϕ, is as follows: Given an error distribution ψ
over Rq and a secret distribution ϕ over Rq, distinguish with non-negligable
advantage, between
(1) samples drawn from the distribution As,ψ for some fixed s drawn
from ϕ; and
(2) samples drawn uniformly from Rq ×Rq.
We remark that Ring-LWE is frequently defined in the context of the dual
R∨ (the different ideal), but in the case that K is a two-power cyclotomic
field, we have R∨ is isomorphic to R as an R-module, so we can interchange
with the simpler ‘unital’ version considered here [19].
Search-to-decision reductions are known in a variety of contexts [19]. This
paper concerns both problems, but especially the search problem.
The Ring-LWE problem is formally similar to the discrete logarithm prob-
lem, which could be phrased in terms of samples (a, as) in a finite field: given
(a, as), find s. In the ring Rq, solving for s given (a, as) can be accomplished
using linear algebra (Gaussian elimination). By introducing a small error e,
so we have (a, as+ e), Gaussian elimination becomes useless, as it amplifies
the errors to the point of washing out all useful information. From another
perspective, the security stems from the fact that addition of an error value is
somehow unpredictably mixing with respect to the multiplicative structure.
Another consequence of this setup is that given just one sample (a, b), one
has as many solutions s to b = as + e as there are possible values for e. In
fact, the problem only has a unique solution once we have enough samples.
If the samples are not Ring-LWE samples at all, then with sufficiently many
samples, it becomes overwhelmingly likely that there are no values of s so
that bi − ais is in the support of the error distribution for all samples s. If
the samples are Ring-LWE, this is the point at which the true secret is the
only solution, with overwhelming probability.
3. Specializing to 2-power cyclotomic Ring-LWE
We now specialize to the following situation, fixing the variables
K,R, q,Rq ,m, n, ζ := ζm, χ, χ0, Eχ0
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for the 2-power cyclotomic case. Whenever we say consider 2-power cyclo-
tomic Ring-LWE, we refer to all the conventions in this section.
3.1. Ring R. We let K and R be the 2n-th cyclotomic field and ring of
integers, respectively, where n is a power of two. This is of dimension n
(note that ϕ(2n) = n), and can be presented as
R = Z[ζ2n] = Z[x]/(x
n + 1).
We will use the notation m = 2n and ζm for a primitive m-th root of unity
in R and for its image in quotients of this ring.
3.2. The ζ-basis for R and its quotients. A basis for R is
1, ζm, ζ
2
m, . . . , ζ
n−1
m .
This will be called the ζ-basis. We have the relation ζnm+1 = 0 in R and in
all its quotients (this is the 2n-th cyclotomic polynomial evaluated at ζm),
but the minimal polynomial for ζm varies in these quotients, and may be a
proper divisor of this cyclotomic polynomial. Nevertheless, in all quotients
of R, we still obtain a ζ-basis, i.e. a power basis in terms of ζ := ζm.
3.3. Prime q. Let q be an odd prime, unramified in R.
3.4. Ring Rq and further quotients. We consider the quotient ring
Rq = R/qR ∼= (Z/qZ)[x]/(xn + 1),
which is an Fq-vector space of dimension n. We may use the same ζ-basis
for this ring.
We may also consider further quotients R/a for a | qR. We may also use
a ζ-basis for these rings, although it may be of lower dimension over Fq (so
fewer powers required). We have
R/a ∼= Fq[x]/(g(x))
where g(x) | xn + 1. In particular, identifying ζ ∈ R/qR with its image in
R/a, the latter has an Fq-basis 1, ζ, ζ
2, . . . , ζdeg(g)−1.
3.5. Error distribution χ, coefficient distribution χ0 and coefficient
support Eχ0. We will denote the error distribution by χ. If this error
distribution is formed using independent identically distributed coefficients
on the ζ-basis, with coefficient distribution χ0 supported on a subset Eχ0 ⊆
Fq, then we say that χ is formed on a ζ-basis with coefficients distributed
according to χ0. This is true, for example, of a discrete Gaussian distribution
on two-power cyclotomics, or a distribution formed by choosing coefficients
uniformly from some subset of Fq. For the former observation, the relevant
fact is the following: the power basis associated to ζm is orthonormal in the
canonical embedding. To see this, use (1) and observe that if ζam has order
2ℓ ≥ 2, then −ζma does also, hence the real parts of the complex embeddings
of roots of unity form a collection symmetrical about zero1.
1This is an advantage of the awkward alteration of the trace pairing in (1).
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For this paper, we will concern ourselves exclusively with this case.
3.6. Secret distribution. We will not make any particular assumption on
the secret distribution. It may be taken to be uniform on Rq.
4. Key theoretical properties
In this section we highlight several key aspects of Ring-LWE absent in
LWE.
4.1. Ring homomorphisms. If a Ring-LWE problem is presented in Rq,
then for any a | qR, we have a ring homomorphism
ρ : Rq → R/a.
This transports samples distributed according to As,χ to samples distributed
according to Aρ(s),ρ(χ).
In general, the effect of ρ on χ is problematic, i.e. it spreads out the error
widely. As an illustration, we give a proposition governing the behaviour of
ρ on χ in the 2-power cyclotomic case, when q ≡ 1 (mod 4).
Proposition 4.1. Suppose we are in the 2-power cyclotomic case, and
R/a ∼= Fqk , and q ≡ 1 (mod 4). If, in Rq, the error distribution χ is
formed on the ζ-basis in Rq with coefficients drawn from χ0 on Fq, then
χ′ := ρ(χ) is formed on the ζ-basis in Fqk with coefficients drawn from χ
′
0
on Fq, where ρ(ζ
k
m) ∈ Fq and
χ′0 =
n/k−1∑
i=0
ρ(ζkm)
iχ0.
Proof. Define r = ord2(q−1), meaning that 2r | q−1 but 2r+1 ∤ q−1. Since
q ≡ 1 (mod 4), we have r ≥ 2. Furthermore, qi + 1 ≡ 2 (mod 4) for all i, so
that ord2(q
2 − 1) = ord2((q − 1)(q + 1)) = r + 1 and, by induction
ord2(q
2i − 1) = r + i
for all i ≥ 1. As k is defined as the embedding degree of the 2n-th roots of
unity, we obtain k = 2n2r .
The element ρ(ζkm) satisfies ρ(ζ
k
m)
2n/k = 1 in R/a. Hence it is itself a
primitive 2n/k-th root of unity, i.e. 2r-th root of unity. Hence ρ(ζkm) ∈ Fq
by the definition of r.
The main statement now follows from the fact that 1, ζm, . . . , ζ
k−1
m is an
Fq-basis of Fqk , that ρ(ζ
k
m) ∈ Fq and that for 0 ≤ j < k and 0 ≤ i < n/k,
we have
ρ(ζ ik+jm ) = ρ(ζ
k
m)
iρ(ζjm) = ρ(ζ
k
m)
iζjm.
 
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For example, in the case that k = n/2, we obtain
χ′0 = χ0 + ρ(ζ
k
m)χ0.
This means the coefficients of χ′ are chosen from a sum of two Gaussian
distributions with different coefficients. This is worse than twice a single
Gaussian. For, the latter is simply a wider Gaussian, and the size of its
support grows by approximately
√
2. However, here the size of the support
Eχ′ is approximately the square of the size of Eχ. This is a symptom of
the protective property of these ring homomorphisms: they transform the
error badly. In fact, very quickly the image of a Gaussian error approaches
uniform in the image ring as the dimension of the image ring decreases.
4.2. Rotating samples. The ring structure allows us to generate new (but
not independent) samples from old.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose χ is invariant under multiplication by ζ. Then
if (a, b) is distributed according to As,χ, then
(1) (ζa, ζb) is also distributed according to As,χ,
(2) (a, ζb) is distributed according to Aζs,χ.
In particular, in the 2-power cyclotomic case, a discrete Gaussian is in-
variant under multiplication by ζm and all its powers.
We call these rotated samples. One could also rotate by other small values,
e.g. 1 + ζm in the 2-power cyclotomic case, at a small cost in changing the
error distribution.
4.3. Subrings and trace maps. If considering Ring-LWE in Rq, where R
is the ring of integers of a number field K, then any subfield L ⊆ K gives
rise to a subring S ⊆ R (i.e., the ring of integers of L) and, modulo q, to
a subring Sq ⊆ Rq. Then Sq is an Fq-vector subspace of Rq, and Rq has a
module structure over Sq. The dimensions of K over L, R over S and Rq
over Sq agree.
There is a linear map T := Tr
Rq
Sq
: Rq → Sq satisfying the following
relationship to the usual trace map from R to S:
TrRS (x) mod qS = Tr
Rq
Sq
(x mod qR).
To see this, remark that qS is elementwise fixed by the Galois group of
K/L and qR is the extension of qS, so the Galois group takes qR to itself.
Therefore the Galois group acts on Rq fixing Sq. Therefore we may define
Tr
Rq
Sq
(x) to be the sum of σ(x) for σ in the Galois group of K/L, and the
relationship above holds.
The ring R is always an S-module, but the reader is cautioned that in a
general number field, R may not be a free module over S.
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4.4. Multiplicative cosets of subrings. The set a0Sq, for any invertible
a0 ∈ Rq, is an Fq-vector subspace of Rq of dimension equal to the dimension
of Sq. Distinct such subspaces intersect only at subspaces of non-invertible
elements of Rq, and R
∗
q (the invertible elements of Rq) lie in the union of all
such subspaces.
Let us write Aa0Sq,s,χ for the distribution on a0Sq × Rq given by choos-
ing a uniformly in a0Sq, choosing e according to error distribution χ and
outputting (a, b := as+ e).
Proposition 4.3. If (a, b) is distributed according to Aa0Sq,s,χ where χ is
invariant under multiplication by ζ, then
(1) (ζa, ζb) is distributed according to Aζa0Sq ,ζs,χ, and
(2) (a, ζb) is distributed according to Aa0Sq ,ζs,χ.
The multiplicative coset structure gives rise to another type of sample
reduction, beyond ring homomorphism. We have
Proposition 4.4. Suppose s ∈ Rq is fixed. Define T := TrRqSq , the trace
map. Consider a collection of samples distributed according to Aa0Sq ,s,χ,
where a0 ∈ R∗q is fixed and satisfies T (a0) 6= 0. Then T maps such samples
to samples distributed according to As′,T (χ) in Sq, where
s′ =
T (a0s)
T (a0)
.
Proof. For a = a0a
′ ∈ a0Sq, since T is Sq-linear, we have
T (as) = a′T (a0s).
This implies that
(T (a), T (as + e)) =
(
a′T (a0), a
′T (a0)
(
T (a0s)
T (a0)
)
+ T (e)
)
This proves the proposition.  
4.5. Trace maps for two-power cyclotomics. The final piece to the
puzzle is the behaviour of the trace map T in the previous section. In the
case of the 2-power cyclotomics, the trace map is particularly well-behaved
in terms of its effect on the error distribution. In fact, it takes very many of
the basis elements ζm to zero. This is a feature of the orthogonality of the
basis 1, ζm, . . . , ζ
n−1
m , and it may be proved with reference to basic algebraic
number theory, as follows.
Using the notation of Section 4.3 in the case of the 2-power m-th cyclo-
tomics K, let L be the k-th cyclotomic subfield. One may take ζk = ζ
m/k
m
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and Sq has a basis 1, ζk, . . . , ζ
k/2−1
k over Fq. We collect terms to write
Rq = Z + ζmZ + · · ·+ ζm/2−1m Z
= (Z + ζkZ+ · · · + ζk/2−1k Z) + ζm(Z + ζkZ + · · ·+ ζk/2−1k Z)
+ · · ·+ ζm/k−1m (Z + ζkZ + · · ·+ ζk/2−1k Z)
= Sq + ζmSq + · · · + ζm/k−1m Sq.
In other words, Rq has a ζ-basis over Sq.
The elements of the Galois group of L/K are given by ζm 7→ ζam for
a ∈ (Z/mZ)∗ satisfying a ≡ 1 (mod k), and so
Tr
Rq
Sq
(ζ im) =
∑
0≤a<m
a≡1 (mod k)
ζ iam
= ζ im
m/k−1∑
a=0
ζ iakm
=
{
0 i 6≡ 0 (mod mk )
m
k ζ
i
m i ≡ 0 (mod mk )
.
In particular, for the trace to the index two subfield, we have:
1
2
T
Rq
Sq
(ζ im) =
{
ζ im i ≡ 0 (mod 2)
0 i ≡ 1 (mod 2) .
This special case can be seen directly by observing that if i is even, then
ζ im ∈ S, while if i is odd, then ζ im is the square root of something in S, i.e.
it satisfies the minimal polynomial x2 − ζ2im , and hence has trace zero. An
alternate proof of the general case then follows by application of the special
case log2(m/k) times.
In summary then, the trace map is much less problematic when applied to
error distributions than a ring homomorphism is. The following proposition
is now immediate.
Proposition 4.5. Let R be the ring of integers of the m-th cyclotomics,
where m is a power of two. Let S be the subring of integers of the k-th
cyclotomics (hence k is also a power of two). Write T := Tr
Rq
Sq
for the trace
map. Suppose that χ is an error distribution formed on the ζ-basis of Rq
with coefficients chosen according to χ0. Then
k
mT takes values in Sq and
k
mT (χ) is the error distribution formed on the ζ-basis of Sq with coefficients
from χ0.
The efficacy of the trace map with respect to the error distribution is due
to its being an orthogonal projection to the space spanned by a subset of an
orthonormal basis.
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5. Reducing to a smaller ring
We demonstrate that if one can find sufficiently many samples whose a
values are restricted to a fixed multiplicative coset of a subring, then we can
reduce the Ring-LWE problem to multiple independent Ring-LWE instances
in the subring, without error inflation.
For this section, we are in the two-power cyclotomic case. Let R be the
ring of m-th cyclotomic integers, where m is a power of two (which have
dimension n, where m = 2n) and S be the ring of k-th cyclotomic integers,
where k | m. Then we have an extension of rings, S ⊆ R of degree m/k.
Suppose that the rational prime q is unramified in R.
Proposition 5.1. Consider a Ring-LWE instance in Rq with secret s and
error distribution χ. Let a0 ∈ Rq be a fixed invertible element. Let T :=
Tr
Rq
Sq
, and suppose that T (a0) is invertible.
Let i be an integer. Then in time polynomial in n and log q, one can reduce
a Ring-LWE sample from distribution Aa0Sq,s,χ to a Ring-LWE sample in
Sq drawn according to secret
T (a0ζ
is)
T (a0)
and error distribution kmT (ζ
iχ) ⊆ Sq.
In particular, by Proposition 4.5, coefficient distributions of a ζ-invariant
χ and its resulting distribution dnT (ζ
iχ) are of the same size; it is in this
sense that the errors do not inflate.
Proof. Consider the sample (a, b) where b = as+ e. Multiplying the second
coordinate of the sample by ζ i and taking the trace kmT , we obtain as in
Proposition 4.4, a sample(
k
m
T (a),
k
m
T (ζ ib)
)
(
k
m
T (a),
k
m
T (aζ is+ ζ ie)
)
=
(
a′
k
m
T (a0), a
′ k
m
T (a0) ·
(
T (a0ζ
is)
T (a0)
)
+
k
m
T (ζ ie)
)
,
where a′ := aa−10 ∈ Sq.
Multiplication in the ring, and taking the trace, are polynomial in the
ring size. 
The following is the main theorem of the paper.
Theorem 5.2. Consider a Ring-LWE instance in Rq with secret s and error
distribution χ which is invariant under multiplication by ζ. Let a0 ∈ Rq be a
fixed invertible element. Let T := Tr
Rq
Sq
, and suppose that T (a0) is invertible.
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Suppose one obtains N samples (a, b) distributed according to Aa0Sq ,s,χ.
Then in time linear in the number of samples N , and polynomial in n and
log q, one can reduce the computation of the secret s ∈ Rq to the solution
of m/k Search Ring-LWE problems in Sq with error distribution
k
mT (χ),
having N samples each.
If χ is formed on the ζ-basis from coefficient distribution χ0 on Fq, then
so is kmT (χ).
Proof. Set i = j in Proposition 5.1 for each j in the range j = 0, . . . ,m/k−1,
to obtain N samples having secret
cj :=
T (a0ζ
js)
T (a0)
.
Using an oracle that solves Search Ring-LWE in Sq, obtain cj.
Collecting all the values cj , we have a linear system of m/k equations over
Sq, whose indeterminates are the coefficients of s (expressed in terms of a
basis for Rq over Sq), of the form
T (a0ζ
js) = cjT (a0), j = 0, . . . ,m/k − 1.
The linear equations are independent provided that {a0ζj} is a set of Sq-
independent vectors in Rq. We saw above that {ζj}j=0,...,m/k−1 is a basis
for Rq over Sq. Thus independence is guaranteed by the fact that a0 is
invertible. Note that we can consider this system to consist of n independent
linear equations over Fq. The system can be solved by Gaussian elimination
to recover s.
All the field operations concerned are polynomial in the size of the ring.
We must apply the trace to N samples m/k times, and we must solve Gauss-
ian elimination of dimension n = m/2 over Fq, which is polynomial in m
and log q.  
As a small corollary, note that in any small Ring-LWE situation where
exhaustive search may apply, it is equally possible to use the above for a
square-root speedup, provided many samples are available. As an example,
if we have a coefficient distribution with support not including all of Fq,
then the following statement demonstrates the approach.
Corollary 5.3. Consider a Ring-LWE instance in Rq with secret s and
error distribution χ formed on a ζ-basis with coefficient distribution having
support strictly smaller than Fq.
There is an algorithm to solve this problem, with success probability 1/2,
in time and number of samples qn/2 times factors polynomial in n log q, using
space polynomial in n log q.
Proof. Note that the hypotheses guarantee χ is invariant under multiplica-
tion by ζ. Let Sq be the ring of index two in Rq (i.e. n-th roots of unity).
Collect samples, discarding all but those with a ∈ Sq. In time O(Nqn/2) we
can accumulate N samples with a ∈ Sq. Apply Theorem 5.2 to reduce to
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two Ring-LWE problems in Sq with N samples each. The error distribution
χ on Rq gives an error distribution
1
2T
Rq
Sq
(χ) on Sq. If χ is formed on a
ζ-basis with coefficients supported in Eχ ( Fq, then
1
2T
Rq
Sq
(χ) is formed on
a ζ-basis with coefficients supported in Eχ ( Fq. Therefore, if the number
of samples is sufficient, the reduced Ring-LWE problems are solvable using
exhaustive search through possible s values.
In our case, we need N large enough so that a Ring-LWE problem in Sq
with N samples has a unique solutions with probability 1/
√
2. Although N
depends upon |Eχ|, for the worst case |Eχ| = q − 1, N is still polynomial in
n log q. Solve the reduced problems by exhaustive search, which takes time
O(qn/2) and each succeeds with probability 1/
√
2.  
6. Background on the Blum-Kalai-Wasserman algorithm
First, we will give a very brief overview of the Blum-Kalai-Wasserman
(BKW) algorithm in the context of LWE [3]. It is a combinatorial algorithm
in which samples are collected and stored so as to facilitate the creation of
new samples, as iterated sums and differences of established ones. The goal
is to create new samples for which a is restricted to a linear subspace. This
is the reduction phase of the full BKW algorithm.
In BKW, after reduction, there is a hypothesis testing phase, in which one
solves a lower-dimensional Ring-LWE problem (that given by restricting a
to the subspace) by exhaustive search over possible secrets. And then there
is a back-substitution phase, where the small piece of the secret recovered in
hypothesis testing is used to rework the problem to prepare the next small
piece for hypothesis testing.
One can think of BKW as a sort of controlled Gaussian elimination on a
matrix whose rows are samples, in which one wants to obtain as much simpli-
fication as possible using just one sum or difference of rows. By keeping the
coefficients of the linear combinations small, we prevent the error ‘blow-up’
that occurs with regular Gaussian elimination. The cost is in needing many
more matrix rows (samples) in order to be able to choose good linear combi-
nations. The back-substitution phase is analogous to the eponymous phase
of Gaussian elimination, with the recovered portion of the secret taking the
role of the free variable. From another point of view, BKW reduction is a
sort of iterated birthday attack, in which one searches for and exploits col-
lisions which eliminate entries of the vectors, reducing to a subspace, where
one searches again for collisions, and so on.
Now let us be more precise. During the reduction phase, only the a-value
of a sample matters, considered as a vector in a vector space V , and the goal
is to create samples with a ∈ W , a linear subspace of V . Suppose, for the
sake of explanation, thatW is defined by the first r coefficients of its vectors
being 0. One generates an ordered list of the first r entries of all the vectors
a which are observed. Whenever a new vector a is observed, it is compared
to the ordered list. If it is not already present, it is added. Otherwise, we
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have discovered two samples (a, b) and (a′, b′) for which (a − a′, b − b′) is
a new sample for which a − a′ lies in W . The penalty is that the error
distribution of these new samples is widened. We begin a new table of such
vectors as they are generated. In this way, we produce a large number of
samples in a smaller subspace at the cost of inflating the error widths.
Instead of performing this reduction all at once, one chooses an appropri-
ate block size B for BKW (which is fixed throughout in the na¨ıve implemen-
tation), which is to say, the codimension of W as a subspace of V . Once we
have produced enough samples in W , we can use these to perform another
BKW reduction to a subspace W ′ ⊆ W of codimension B in W . The cost
of a reduction step is exponential in B, so we keep B as small as possible.
We perform block reductions until the samples are all taken from a small
enough subspace to run an exhaustive search or other strategy to finish off
the problem. The limiting factor on shrinking B is an upper limit on the
number of blocks used overall. Each reduction into codimension B has a
cost in error-inflation. We have a limit on the total error inflation (because
hypothesis testing will fail if the error is so inflated as to appear uniform),
which limits the total number of blocks.
The BKW algorithm has been improved in recent years, including using
coding theory to reduce the number of values that need to be stored and
compared, sieving at each step, allowing the block size to vary, using the
Fourier transform to speed up hypothesis testing; see [1] [12] [15] [16] [17]
[18].
7. Reduction using BKW
In this section, we address the problem of finding sufficiently many sam-
ples (a, b) having a from an appropriate subring Sq ⊆ Rq, so that Theorem
5.2 will apply. For this, we use the reduction phase of the BKW algorithm.
We emphasize that it is possible, once the samples have been given in an
appropriate basis, to use an off-the-shelf BKW reduction algorithm, includ-
ing coded BKW with sieving etc., for the reduction phase. Then, Theorem
5.2, which is polynomial time, replaces all the other phases of BKW.
The only adaptor necessary to connect BKW to Theorem 5.2 is an atten-
tion to the basis used. In order to perform the reduction, we begin with the
ζ-basis of Rq over Fq, namely
1, ζ, ζ2, . . . , ζn−1,
and then reorder it to produce a prioritized basis. The most important
property for our purposes is that:
(1) if one of ζ i and ζj has lower multiplicative order than the other, then
it comes later than the other
One computationally convient way to accomplish this is to take the bit-
reversal permutation on n elements (i.e. a maps to b if the binary represen-
tation of a in log2(n) bits, read backwards, is b), then reserve the order. For
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concreteness, the prioritized basis (in part) is as follows:
ζn−1m , ζ
n
2
−1
m , ζ
3n
4
−1
m , ζ
n
4
−1
m , . . . , ζ
3n
4
m , ζ
n
4
m, ζ
n
2
m , 1.
Using any type of BKW reduction, one now reduces, with respect to this
basis. To be precise, one seeks to eliminate the earlier coefficients of the
elements a, as expressed in this basis. At the end, at most the last 2k coef-
ficients are non-zero, for some small k. For example, one may reduce until
only the last 1, 2, 4 or 8 coefficients are possibly non-zero. The varying block
sizes during the reduction algorithm itself need not respect any restrictions,
and improvements such as coded-BKW with sieving, may be used.
After reduction, one has obtained samples with a ∈ Sq for S of dimension
2k. One then applies Theorem 5.2.
8. The Ring-BKW algorithm
In this section we summarize the Ring-BKW algorithm for completeness.
In short, one uses an off-the-shelf BKW reduction algorithm on samples with
respect to a particular choice of basis, then applies Theorem 5.2. The impor-
tant point is that the back-substitution phase of BKW is no longer needed,
and the hypothesis-testing phase can be parallelized. The hypothesis-testing
phase can also be off-the-shelf, including recent improvements using the
Fourier transform etc. [12]. However, we will elaborate somewhat.
Ring-BKW algorithm. Choose a subring S ⊆ R of dimension B over
Z (corresponding to a lower-degree 2-power cyclotomic field), to which we
wish to reduce. Define Rq and Sq as before. The Ring-BKW Algorithm is
given as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Ring-BKW Algorithm
(1) Run BKW Reduction (as in Section 7 above with prioritized basis)
on the values a until all samples (a, b) have a ∈ Sq.
(2) Use Theorem 5.2 to create samples from n/B different Ring-LWE
problems in Sq.
(3) Solve these Ring-LWE problems using any method of choice.
(4) Use Theorem 5.2 to recover the secret s in polynomial time from
these solutions.
However, any reduction algorithm to obtain values a ∈ Sq will do as
well. The following theorem relates any reduction algorithm to the solution
of Search Ring-LWE. For the following, we consider Gaussian error with a
well-defined width; an expansion factor refers to a multiplicative factor on
the width.
Theorem 8.1. Suppose that B is an algorithm which, given a Ring-LWE
problem of dimension n over Fq, produces N Ring-LWE samples of dimen-
sion B with error expansion factor of f , in time tB(n,B, f,N), and using
rB(n,B, f,N) original samples.
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Suppose that R is an algorithm which solves Ring-LWE in dimension B
over Fq in time tR(B), given error width less than or equal to s and at least
N samples.
Then, there is an algorithm A which solves Ring-LWE in Rq having width
σ in time
tB(n,B, s/σ,N) +
n
B
tR(B) +N · (time polynomial in n log q),
using rB(n,B, s/σ,N) samples.
Proof. Algorithm 1 will succeed provided f ≤ s/σ, so that the reduced Ring-
LWE problems are solvable. Therefore the time to run the reduction phase
is tB(n,B, s/σ,N). The time to create the smaller Ring-LWE problems is
linear in N and polynomial in n log q from Theorem 5.2. Solving the nB
smaller Ring-LWE problems takes time tR(B) each. Then reconstructing
the secret (as in Theorem 5.2) again takes polynomial time.  
9. Advanced Keying Speedup
In the previous section, one uses BKW on LWE to perform reduction.
Given a Ring-LWE sample, there are in fact n rotated samples one could
feed into the reduction:
(a, b), (ζa, ζb), . . . , (ζn−1a, ζn−1b).
Na¨ıvely, one may include them all, or include the first one. Probably the best
course of action is to include them all, to increase the number of collisions
located amongst the available samples (since the number of samples needed
is the downside to BKW in general). By including all rotations, one catches
all collisions of the form a1±ζka2 = 0. These are all perfectly useful collisions
for the algorithm, if the error term is ζ-invariant. In this section we propose
a space-saving approach based on symmetries, which is equivalent, in terms
of collisions obtained per sample, to storing all rotations of the samples.
Our proposal in this section is an analogue of the space-saving technique
used in regular BKW, wherein for each sample (a, b) we may derive two
samples (a, b) and (−a,−b): we choose one canonically (where the first
coefficient of a is in
{
0, . . . , q−12
}
, say), and save only this one. By doing
so, we will catch all collisions between samples where their sum or their
difference vanishes, and save half the table space in the process, since one
need only store vectors whose first entry is chosen amongst q+12 possibilities,
instead of q.
The fundamental observation is that the prioritized basis proposed in the
last section is particularly well-suited to this type of strategy, because of its
relationship with the ‘negacyclic permutation’ effect of multiplication by ζ.
Consider the values
a, ζa, ζ2a, . . . , ζn−1a.
Write ai for the vector of coefficients of ζ
ia in the prioritized basis (which are
elements of Fq). Write |ai| for the same list, but with each coefficient/entry
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replaced with the absolute value of its minimal representative modulo q
(minimal representative means representative closest to zero). In particular,
there are q+12 possible values for each entry.
Consider a general element a (i.e. consider the coefficients to be distinct
variables) and write |ai|j for the j-th entry of |ai|. Let B divide n, a power of
2. Thus this improvement, at least in the description provided here, depends
somewhat sensitively on block size. There are several useful observations in
this case:
(1) The entries of |ai| consist of a permutation of the entries of |a| = |a0|.
(2) The blocks of length B, |ai|0≤j≤B−1, for i = 0, . . . , n/B consist of
disjoint subsets of the coefficients of |a|.
(3) If i ≡ i′ (mod n/B), then the sequence |ai′ |0≤j≤B−1 is a permutation
of the sequence |ai|0≤j≤B−1.
(Similar statements apply to subsequent blocks of length B also.)
In view of these facts, one has the following strategy. Suppose one is
searching for collisions amongst the initial blocks of length B. Then, pro-
vided one has a means of choosing a canonical representative amongst the
blocks |ai|0≤j≤B−1 for i ≡ i0 (mod n/B) (which are all reorderings of one
another), one need only store one of these B different rotations. Hence the
table size is reduced from q
B−1
2 (i.e. storing entries of length B with first
non-zero entry chosen to be ‘positive’, equivalently in the range 0, . . . , q−12 )
to at most
qB
2B
+
n2qn/B
2B
,
obtained by storing the canonical choice amongst the B choices of i ≡
i0 (mod n/B), with the same convention on first entry.
A possible canonical choice is the ordering which has smallest first entry,
together with some tie-breaking conventions, e.g. smallest second entry,
etc., and if all entries are equal, then some appropriate convention on sign
changes between a and |a|, etc. It is not possible to break a tie if the first
B entries of ai and aj actually agree under one of the rotations, which
accounts for the correction factor. To make this precise, observe that what
we are actually checking for is something in the kernel of Tr
Rq
Sq
(
(ζ i − ζj)a)
for S ⊂ R of dimension B, and i 6≡ j considered modulo n/B. Each such
kernel has size qn/B . For any of these n2B
(
n
B − 1
)
qn/B possibly problematic
examples, we may wish to include all B rotations at most.
This method provides some advantage in table size if there is at least one
sample for which we can store fewer than all possible rotations. However, the
loose bound above indicates that the advantage is asymptotically a table-size
factor of 1/B provided that B > n/B.
10. In practice
It is evident that the runtime of Ring-BKW is expected to be better than
that of standard BKW (in any of its current forms), since the reduction and
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hypothesis testing phases may be taken to be the same, but the backsub-
stitution phase is no longer required. Furthermore, the smaller Ring-LWE
problems can be solved in parallel.
As a potential further improvement, advanced keying provides a table size
reduction factor which is applicable when certain block sizes are powers of
two. This may or may not be useful or extendable in view of the changing
block sizes sometimes employed in BKW reduction.
The Ring-LWE Challenges [11] are in the form of Tweaked Ring-LWE,
which refers to dual Ring-LWE transfered to the unital version (see [11,
§2.3]), so that the parameter assumptions in this paper apply to the two-
power cyclotomic challenges included therein. It would be very interesting
to test these algorithms on those parameters, but it is beyond the scope of
this paper.
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